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Essay
ALFRED L. BROPHY*
Aloha Jurisprudence:  Equity Rules
in Property
William Blackstone’s refrain that “[t]here is nothing whichso generally strikes the imagination and engages the af-
fections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and
despotic dominion” is echoed seemingly everywhere these days.1
Property scholarship is increasingly emphasizing the right of ex-
clusion.2  Takings jurisprudence, one of the great barometers of
respect for private property, has expanded, even if it has not
been as respectful of property as some would like.3  Some schol-
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University of Hawaii in spring 2006 as well as William S. Brewbaker, Carol N.
Brown, David Callies, Trina Jones, Aviam Soifer, Justin Levinson, and most espe-
cially Carl C. Christensen for teaching me about aloha jurisprudence.  Most of what
I know about this subject I learned from Carl and many of the cases I learned about
from David Callies.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2; see also  Albert W. Alschuler,
Rediscovering Blackstone , 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-36 (1996); John C.P. Goldberg,
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process and the Right to a Law for the
Redress of Wrongs , 115 YALE L.J. 524, 545-59 (2005) (suggesting an elevation of the
right to redress to a status afforded to such rights as property).
2 See, e.g. , David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others
from Private Property:  A Fundamental Constitutional Right , 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 39 (2000); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property , 9 RUTGERS L. REV.
357 (1954); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude , 77 NEB. L. REV.
730 (1998).
3 Perhaps the leading example of takings jurisprudence diminishing property
rights is Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 533
U.S. 606 (2001), now provides for a natural rights interpretation of property inde-
pendent of (and greater than) investment-backed expectations.  As Justice Kennedy
said in denying a claim that the purchasers took the property with limitations al-
ready in place, “Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limi-
tations on the use and value of land.” Id.  at 627.
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ars, including the influential University of Chicago professor
Richard Epstein,4 are calling for a return to an era that is more
protective of private property, such as the one that existed before
the New Deal.5  Epstein builds on several decades of scholarship
that has examined the early twentieth-century respect for prop-
erty rights.6  Running alongside these developments is increased
respect by the federal government’s executive branch for cost-
benefit analysis, which further protects against regulation.7
Yet in one place, rather remote from the agitation over prop-
erty rights in Washington, D.C., there is another refrain.  It de-
clares respect for the rights of the community to use private
property, careful consideration of the rights of people who have
been ousted from property, and the weighing of equities to deter-
mine the appropriate balance between property rights, the rights
of neighbors, and the rights of the community more generally.  In
Hawaii, the legislature has gone so far as to instruct courts to
apply the “aloha spirit.”  Hawaii’s Revised Statutes instruct:
In exercising their power on behalf of the people and in ful-
fillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the
people, the legislature, governor, lieutenant governor, execu-
tive officers of each department, the chief justice, associate
justices, and judges of the appellate, circuit, and district courts
may contemplate and reside with the life force and give con-
sideration to the “Aloha Spirit.”8
The rhetorical backlash against broad eminent domain powers appears in Alberto
Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political Philosophies Post-
Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237 (2006). See generally  David L. Callies, Regula-
tory Takings and the Supreme Court:  How Prospectives on Property Rights Have
Changed from Penn Central to  Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing
About It , 28 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999).
4 See  James W. Ely, Jr., Impact of Richard A. Epstein , 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. (forthcoming Dec. 2006), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=825045.
5 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION
(2006); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
6 See, e.g. , BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS:  FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001); David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling
Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective , 51 VAND. L. REV. 797
(1998).
7 See, e.g. , Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All , 57 ALA. L. REV. 103 (2005) (critiquing
the shift to cost-benefit analysis in regulatory and judicial settings).  The recent his-
tory of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory setting begins with Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute , 448 U.S. 607 (1980), and
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  This Order reads a
requirement of cost-benefit analysis into the regulation of a potential carcinogen.
8 HAW. REV. STAT. § 5-7.5(b) (1993).
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Hawaii’s Revised Statutes further state that aloha is “mutual re-
gard and affection and extends warmth in caring with no obliga-
tion in return.  ‘Aloha’ is the essence of relationships in which
each person is important to every other person for collective ex-
istence.”9  They add that aloha spirit was “the working philoso-
phy of native Hawaiians” which “was presented as a gift to the
people of Hawaii.”10  Hawaiian courts are following those in-
structions and developing what one might call an “aloha property
jurisprudence.”
This Essay explores some of the contours of that jurispru-
dence.  Part I briefly sketches the conflict over property and
community rights in American history to help establish the his-
torical legitimacy of aloha jurisprudence.  Part II then turns to
Hawaii in the years following western contact to set some of the
stage for a consideration of the role of property rights in Hawai-
ian society.  The Essay moves to contemporary law in Part III
with a study of Native Hawaiian rights to access property and a
few statutory and constitutional provisions that run alongside
Hawaiian case law.  It also discusses cases involving adverse pos-
session against cotenants and others involving enforcement of
covenants by injunctions or money damages.  The adverse pos-
session and covenant cases reveal that the aloha spirit may have
implications outside of a narrowly confined set of Native Hawai-
ian rights cases.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of legislative
restrictions on property rights that illuminates the popular con-
ception of the community’s interest in property rights.  This Es-
say, thus, shows a few ways that the aloha spirit has appeared in
Hawaiian jurisprudence and suggests a few ways that it might
continue to grow in the future, much as law and literature,11 fem-
inist,12 and critical race scholarship suggest the alternative worlds
that might be.13
9 Id.  § 5-7.5(a).
10 Id.
11 See, e.g. , Margaret Valentine Turano, Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and the
Marital Property Law , 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 180 (1998) (discussing how
“Austen and Brontë were able to create heroines who transcended the coverture-
wife model”).
12 See, e.g. , Felice Batlan, Law and the Fabric of Everyday:  The Settlement
Houses, Sociological Jurisprudence, and the Gendering of Urban Legal Culture , 15 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 235 (2006).
13 See, e.g. , David Cole, The Idea of Humanity:  Human Rights and Immigrants’
Rights , 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627 (2006) (proposing methods, such as
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I
A SKETCH OF ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF PROPERTY
We have heard echoes of an alternative property jurisprudence
at various times and places in American history.  John Adams’s
1765 essay, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law , dis-
cussed ways in which the legacy of feudalism and the resulting
hierarchy has corrupted English property law.14  Adams’s Disser-
tation  was largely concerned with the public, as opposed to pri-
vate, law of feudalism.  During the American Revolution,
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense  indicted political power based
on feudalism.  Before going on to attack the idea of heredity suc-
cession, Paine wrote the following about William the Conqueror:
“A French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and establish-
ing himself King of England against the consent of the natives, is,
in plain terms a very paltry, rascally original.  It certainly hath no
divinity in it.”15  Those rights of heredity succession had most di-
rect importance in considering who would rule; however, Paine
later wrote about what he thought should be the limited rights of
heredity in Rights of Man , his defense of the French Revolution:
Every generation is, and must be competent to all the pur-
poses which its occasions require.  It is the living , and not the
dead , that are to be accommodated.  When man ceases to BE,
his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer
any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no
longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or
how its government shall be organised, or how administered.16
changes in statutory construction, to introduce the idea of humanity from human
rights norms into United States immigration law).
14 JOHN ADAMS, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law , in THE REVOLU-
TIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 21 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
15 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 9-10 (London, H.D. Symonds, Paternoster-
Row 1793) (1776).
16 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 5 (London-Derry, Soc’y of Gentlemen 1791).
Paine later wrote about the ways that hereditary rights might limit the rights of fu-
ture generations:
A  cannot make a will to take from B  the property of B , and give it to C ;
yet this is the manner in which what is called hereditary succession by law
operates.  A certain generation makes a will, under the form of a law, to
take away the rights of the commencing generation, and of all future gener-
ations, and convey those rights to a third person, who afterwards comes
forward, and assumes the government in consequence of that illicit
conveyance.
THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATION ON FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 11 (London,
Daniel Isaac Eaton pub. 1795).
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Throughout the early nineteenth century, Americans ques-
tioned the appropriate limits of vested rights.  As we moved
away from property-rights qualifications for voting, courts peri-
odically limited the rights of property.  In the 1820s, the courts
confronted (and frequently invalidated) legislative attempts to
extend bankruptcy protection and thus interfere with creditors’
expectations.17  Similarly, the Taney Court’s limitation of a com-
pany’s rights to prevent competition in Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge18 led to fears that courts were unduly limiting
property rights.  In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taney
warned against too much respect for private property:  “While
the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not
forget, that the community also have [sic] rights, and that the
happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faith-
ful preservation.”19  The decision led Chancellor Kent to write in
the New York Review  about his fear that the Supreme Court was
no longer protecting property rights.  His review of the case be-
gan with an examination of the august place of the United States
Supreme Court:
It is looked up to as the last asylum of persecuted justice. . . . If
civil liberty should, in the progress of human events, find no
other resting place where her rights and her blessings could be
secure, it was fondly hoped, by those eminent patriots and
statesmen who framed, adopted, defended, and for many years
cherished the Constitution of the United States, that they had
at length provided a tribunal where all citizens, and all local
communities, might find redress, and none be permitted to op-
press . . . .20
17 Theodore W. Ruger, “A Question Which Convulses the Nation”:  The Early Re-
public’s Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power , 117 HARV. L. REV. 827,
844-55 (2004) (detailing the Kentucky legislature’s debate over the interference with
expectations through bankruptcy legislation). See also  William W. Fisher III, Mak-
ing Sense of Madison:  Nedelsky on Private Property , 18 L. & SOC. INQ. 547, 554-57
(1993) (reviewing JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:  THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY
(1990)); James L. Huston, The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of
Aristocracy, and the American Concept of the Distribution of Wealth, 1765–1900 , 98
AM. HIST. REV. 1079 (1993).  Daniel Hulsebosch provides a context for the compet-
ing visions of takings in the early United States. See  Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The
Anti-Federalist Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Takings Jurisprudence , 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 967 (2005).
18 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
19 Id. at 548.
20 James Kent, Supreme Court of the United States , 2 N.Y. REV. 372, 372 (1838).
See also  Alfred Laurence Brophy, The Intersection of Property and Slavery in
Southern Legal Thought:  From Missouri Compromise Through Civil War (June
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The Taney Court was not living up to Kent’s vision:  “The change
is so great and so ominous, that a gathering gloom is cast over the
future.  We seem to have sunk suddenly below the horizon, to
have lost the light of the sun . . . .”21  He found “most alarming
and most heretical . . . the new-fangled doctrine, that the con-
tracts of the State are to be construed strictly as against the
grantee.”22
At other times, courts even applied limitations on well-estab-
lished property rights in private law cases.  In Dyett v. Pendleton ,
for example, the New York Court of Errors relieved a modest,
middle-class family of a lease in a building where the landlord
operated a house of “ill repute.”23  The court concluded it “was
no longer respectable for moral and decent persons to dwell or
enter therein”24 so there was a moral basis for excusing perform-
ance of a clear contract.25  Another example of judicial employ-
ment of such considerations of morality comes from the early
twentieth century, when the doctrine of unconscionability was
expanded by courts interpreting grossly unfair contracts entered
into by illiterate African-Americans.26
In the same era as Dyett , the United States Magazine and Dem-
ocratic Review  asked about the basis for assertions of property
rights.  In an essay entitled What Is the Reason? , it asked why
some people have property and others have none.27  In the New
York anti-rent movement, which convulsed upstate New York
from 1839 through the Civil War, some courts addressed the
question of whether long-term tenants could be held to cove-
nants signed long ago.28  In fact, the entire anti-rent movement
2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author)
(describing conflicting attitudes of Whigs and Democrats towards property).
21 Kent, supra  note 20, at 385.
22 Id.  at 389.
23 8 Cow. 727, 735 (N.Y. 1826).
24 Id.  at 736.
25 For further discussion of the case, see Alfred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment:
The Moral Worlds and Modes of Reasoning of Antebellum Jurists , 79 B.U. L. REV.
1161, 1198 (1999) (reviewing PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD:  JUDGE-
MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997)).
26 See, e.g. , Hall v. Russell, 178 P. 679 (Okla. 1919); First Nat’l Bank of Watonga v.
Wade, 111 P. 205 (Okla. 1913).  Rachel D. Godsil has a somewhat different interpre-
tation of early twentieth-century judicial protections of African-Americans. See
Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance:  The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era , 105
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2006).
27 What Is the Reason? , 16 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 17, 23 (1845).
28 See CHARLES W. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND
POLITICS, 1839–1865 (2001).
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tapped into controversies over long-term vested rights against
claims of community rights.  One proposed solution was legisla-
tion that would allow long-term leaseholders to purchase their
way out of those obligations.  In the movement’s final stages af-
ter 1850, court decisions left the movement with little room for
maneuvering:  there could be no eminent domain and no altera-
tion of landlords’ ability to obtain distraint.  Some tenants began
to settle, and landlords sold off their estates.29
In response to the confrontation, a series of court decisions
limited the rights of landlords.  The 1850 decision in Overbagh v.
Patrie  invalidated the quarter-sale right, which permitted a land-
lord to obtain a quarter of the sale price when tenants sold their
interest in land.30  The key to Judge Amasa Parker’s decision for
a three-judge panel of the New York Supreme Court in
Overbagh  was his discussion of public policy regarding enforce-
ment of the quarter-rent provisions.  He concluded that feudal-
ism was “utterly unsuited, every vestige of it, to the institutions
under which we live, and to the personal independence and
equality of political rights enjoyed by our citizens.”31  Parker saw
the incidents of feudalism as inconsistent with the political ideas
of the time:
The progress of man in intelligence, in knowledge, in the arts
of peace and in political advancement, now calls for tenures in
accordance with perfect political equality, and entire personal
freedom; and if there be vestiges of feudal tenure still remain-
ing here, they should be eradicated as speedily as is consistent
with a strict regard to the rights of property of those
concerned.32
He also saw the quarter-rent provisions as excessive, an interfer-
ence with land alienability, and a discouragement to land devel-
opment:  “After twelve alienations [the landlord] will have
received twice the improved value of the farm, in addition to the
price paid on the original purchase.  Yet their claim will be in no
respect lessened—the demand will be insatiable—its existence
29 For those interested in the conflict over vested rights, James Fenimore Cooper’s
trilogy on the anti-rent movement provides a defense of the rights of property own-
ers. See J. FENIMORE COOPER, SATANSTOE (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
1845); J. FENIMORE COOPER, THE CHAINBEARER (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
1845); and J. FENIMORE COOPER, THE REDSKINS (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
1846).
30 8 Barb. 28, 43-46 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1850).
31 Id.  at 43.
32 Id.
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interminable.”33  The legal basis running parallel to Judge
Parker’s public policy discussion was his equation of the quarter-
rents with “fines on alienation”—feudal incidents that required
payment to a lord upon alienation of property.34  A 1787 Act of
the New York legislature had abolished such tenures.35  Judge
Parker reasoned that in the case of the quarter-rents, there was
no reversion and hence the grantors had no estate upon which
they might condition the payment of the quarter-rent.36
The New York Court of Appeals’ 1852 decision in De Peyster
v. Michael37 confirmed the holding of the lower court’s decision
in Overbagh .  De Peyster  interpreted a grant from 1785, before
the New York legislature prohibited feudal tenures.38  Hence,
Chief Justice Charles H. Ruggles had to apply the statute retro-
actively to find that there could be no reversion from leases in
fee.  Ruggles concluded, with somewhat ambiguous rationale,
that
after a careful examination of the grounds on which these re-
straints on alienations in fee were originally sustained in En-
gland; of the change in the law there by statute nearly 600
years ago; of the mode in which that change was wrought; and
finding that the same change has taken place here by our own
statutes, we cannot entertain a doubt that the condition to pay
sale money on leases in fee, is repugnant to the estate granted,
and therefore void in law.39
Thus, if landlords had no reversion, they could not restrain alien-
ation, which was necessary to effectively enforce the quarter-
rents.
During the Civil War, there were alternative views of property
in operation when some radical republicans advocated broad
confiscation and redistribution of Confederate property.  Among
the examples one might cite are the Second Confiscation Act, the
Doolittle Act, and the Emancipation Proclamation itself.  And
while loyal slaveholders in the District of Columbia received mi-
nor compensation for slaves who were freed, the Thirteenth
Amendment subsequently barred compensation to slaveholders.
For, as Senator Charles Sumner said:
33 Id. at 44.
34 Id.  at 45.
35 Id.  at 42.
36 Id.  at 34.
37 6 N.Y. 467 (1852).
38 Id. at 489.
39 Id. at 505.
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[I]f money is to be paid as compensation, clearly it cannot go
to the master, who for generations has robbed the slave of his
toil and all its fruits, so that, in justice, he may be regarded
now as the trustee of accumulated earnings with interest which
he has never paid over.  Any money paid as compensation
must belong every dollar of it to the slave.40
The emancipation of slavery represented a huge abolition of
property rights.  There was consideration of further uncompen-
sated takings, but the hold of private property and the politics of
reconciliation were too strong to allow that.
While we heard much talk of expansive property rights during
the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, there were important
strands of thought advocating limits to property rights.  For ex-
ample, Progressive Era jurists upheld zoning,41 while politicians
embraced the estate tax.  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
1935 letter to Congress in which he proposed expansion of the
estate tax sounds distant to twenty-first century ears, which are
so used to the protection of wealth and a desire to reduce taxes:
The transmission from generation to generation of vast for-
tunes by will, inheritance, or gift is not consistent with the ide-
als and sentiments of the American people.
The desire to provide security for one’s self and one’s family
is natural and wholesome, but it is adequately served by a rea-
sonable inheritance.  Great accumulations of wealth cannot be
justified on the basis of personal and family security.  In the
last analysis such accumulations amount to the perpetuation of
great and undesirable concentration of control in a relatively
few individuals over the employment and welfare of many,
many others.
Such inherited economic power is as inconsistent with the
ideals of this generation as inherited political power was in-
consistent with the ideals of the generation which established
our Government.42
The 1960s war on poverty led to dramatically increased concern
for tenants and those with even less property, such as welfare
recipients.43  However, the foundational principle always was—
40 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1481 (1864). See also MICHAEL VOREN-
BERG, FINAL FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 108-09 (2001) (discussing the debate).
41 See, e.g. , Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
42 H.R. REP. NO. 1681-74, at 2 (1935).
43 See, e.g. , Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (find-
ing an implied warranty of habitability); Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d
867 (Iowa 1989) (finding a retaliatory eviction); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202
(Vt. 1984) (finding an implied warranty of habitability).
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and almost certainly always will be—protection of private prop-
erty.  Those rights are growing stronger as evidenced by the re-
peal of the estate tax and the extension of copyright protection,
to take only two examples.  But at the margins, courts and legis-
lators still debate the appropriate boundaries of vested property
rights.
II
HAWAIIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Hawaii’s legal history primarily grapples with one central
event:  the adoption of a land regime based on western concep-
tions of individual ownership during the Great Mahele of 1848.
The Great Mahele marked the transition from native patterns of
ownership, where all land was held by the king, to common law
ownership.  During the Mahele, people testified about their land
in order to make out a case for being assigned rights to it.  Dur-
ing this process they recounted who lived there, when and how
they used the property, and how they thought about their rela-
tionships to other occupiers of the land.44
Because of the Mahele’s importance to subsequent rights in
land, interpretations of the event have varied rather dramatically.
Some early interpretations saw it as part of a process of “civiliza-
tion.”  This is illustrated perhaps most clearly in the writings of
missionaries like Hiram Bingham, whose 1855 book, A Residence
of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands , charts changes in
property regimes from native practices to western-based prop-
erty rights.  Bingham begins the discussion of his 1820 arrival in
Hawaii with this provocative statement about his views of the
natives and his goals there:
Their manœuvres in their canoes, some being propelled by
short paddles, and some by small sails, attracted the attention
of our little group, and for a moment, gratified curiosity; but
the appearance of destitution, degradation, and barbarism,
among the chattering, and almost naked savages, whose heads
and feet, and much of their sunburnt swarthy skins, were bare,
was appalling.  Some of our number, with gushing tears,
44 The records of the Great Mahele are a gold mine for historians and anthropolo-
gists.  Patrick V. Kirch and Marshall Sahlins rely upon the records to reconstruct a
community on the north side of Oahu in their 1992 book, Anahulu:  The Anthropol-
ogy of History in the Kingdom of Hawaii . See  1 PATRICK V. KIRCH & MARSHALL
SAHLINS, ANAHULU:  THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HISTORY IN THE KINGDOM OF
HAWAI I (1992).
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turned away from the spectacle.  Others with firmer nerve
continued their gaze, but were ready to exclaim, “Can these be
human beings!  How dark and comfortless their state of mind
and heart!  How imminent the danger to the immortal soul,
shrouded in this deep pagan gloom!  Can such beings be civi-
lized?  Can they be Christianized?”45
Thus, Bingham focused on the goal of converting the natives to
Christianity and creating civilization.
The role of property and the rule of law played an important
part in Bingham’s story.  In his short recitation of the history of
the islands, one can hear echoes of the period’s celebration of
property rights.  Bingham portrayed Hawaiian land ownership as
a feudal system and suggested that such patterns of ownership
(and a lack of the rule of law, more generally) left the people
without an incentive to develop economically:
Claiming the right of soil throughout his realm, and the right
to make and abrogate regulations at pleasure, and using the
privilege of a conqueror who could not endure to have others
enjoy their just rights, Kamehameha wielded a despotism as
absolute probably as the islands ever knew.  Retaining a part
of the lands as his individual property, which he intended
should be inherited by his children, he distributed the remain-
ing lands among his chiefs and favorites, who, for their use,
were to render public service in war or peace, and in raising a
revenue.  These let out large portions of their divisions to their
favorites or dependants, who were in like manner to render
their service, and bring the rent; and these employed cultiva-
tors on shares, who lived on the products which they divided,
or shared with their landlord, rendering service when re-
quired, so long as they chose to occupy the land.  Thus, from
the poor man who could rent 1/8 or 1/4 of an acre, up to the
sovereign, each was, in some sense, dependent on the will of a
superior, and yet, almost all had one or more under them
whom they could control or command.
This, in a conquered, ignorant and heathen country, without
the principles of equity, was a low and revolting state of soci-
ety; where the mass could have no voice in enacting laws, or
levying taxes, or appropriating the revenue, or in establishing
a limited rent for the use of lands, fisheries or fish-ponds.  To
conceive of all as supremely selfish, and each superior as desir-
ous to aggrandize himself at the expense of others, would do
them no injustice.
With the limited knowledge and skill they possessed, it
would hardly be expected that cheerful and productive indus-
try would thrive, even in such a clime and soil, unless the prin-
45 HIRAM BINGHAM, A RESIDENCE OF TWENTY-ONE YEARS IN THE SANDWICH
ISLANDS 81 (3d ed., Canadaigua, N.Y., H.D. Goodwin 1855).
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ciples of benevolence or a high public spirit could be engrafted
in the hearts of the people, or that the population could multi-
ply while the means of subsistence were scanty, clothing and
lodging miserable, possessions utterly insecure, and all inheri-
tance hopeless or uncertain.46
Bingham thought the process of civilization entailed the devel-
opment of Christian beliefs, middle-class modesty, and the mar-
ket economy.47  However, many people were limited in their
property rights; and that, along with a lack of capital, impeded
the process of conversion:
But how difficult and long must be the process of learning to
make use, or keep in order and enjoy the variety of useful
articles which the arts of civilized life supply, had the chiefs
and people possessed money or exportable products in abun-
dance, to purchase the materials at pleasure!  But not one in a
thousand had the money or the exportable products at com-
mand, and while it seemed to us a difficult thing for the chiefs
to pay for half a dozen brigs and schooners, for which they had
contracted, and to build and furnish houses for themselves, it
seemed equally difficult for the common people to supply
themselves, who had not the means to purchase the soil they
cultivated, if they had been allowed to buy it, nor the capital to
put a plough, a pair of oxen, and a cart upon a farm, if farms
were given them in fee simple; nor the skill and enterprise to
use them advantageously, if every hand-spade-digger of kalo
and potatoe ground had been gratuitously furnished with land,
teams, and implements of husbandry, like the yeomanry of
New England.48
But Bingham saw some evidence of civilization in the decline
of surfing, a decline he attributed to time natives spent harvest-
ing sandalwood.  Indeed, Bingham provided one of the earliest
descriptions of surfing:
[The royal parties] resorted to the favorite amusement of all
classes—sporting on the surf, in which they distinguish them-
selves from most other nations.  In this exercise, they generally
avail themselves of the surf-board, an instrument manufac-
tured by themselves for the purpose.  It is made of buoyant
wood, thin at the edges and ends, but of considerable thick-
ness in the middle, smooth, and ingeniously adapted to the
purpose of sustaining a moderate weight and gliding rapidly
on the surface of the water.  It is of various dimensions, from
three feet in length, and six or eight inches in breadth, to four-
teen feet in length, and twenty inches in breadth.  In the use of
46 Id.  at 49-50.
47 Id.  at 169.
48 Id.  at 170.
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it, the islander, placing himself longitudinally upon the board
as it rests upon the surface of the water, and using his naked
arms and hands as a pair of oars, rows off from the sand-beach
a quarter, or half a mile into the ocean.  Meeting the succes-
sion of surges as they are rolling towards the shore, he glides
with ease over such as are smooth, plunges under or through
such as are high and combing, allowing them to roll over him
and his board, and coming out unhurt on the other side, he
presses on till his distance is sufficient for a race, or till he has
passed beyond the breaking or combing surf.  After a little
rest, turning around and choosing one of the highest surges for
his locomotive , he adjusts himself and board, continuing longi-
tudinally upon it, directing his head towards the shore, and
just before the highest part of the wave reaches him, he gives
two or three propelling strokes with his spread hands.  The
board, having its hindmost end now considerably elevated,
glides down the moving declivity, and darts forward like a
weaver’s shuttle.  He rides with railroad speed on the forefront
of the surge, the whitening surf foaming and roaring just be-
hind his head, and is borne in triumph to the beach.  Often in
this rough riding, which is sometimes attended with danger,
several run the race together.49
And yet, after describing that fun practice, Bingham observes
how surfing declined from the early 1820s, when he arrived,
through the early 1850s.  He did not believe this decline was
caused by specific prohibitions adopted by the missionaries
against it.  Rather, he attributes it to changing habits of dress,
behavior, religion, and the rise of the market for sandalwood on
the islands, which led people to work rather than surf:
The decline or discontinuance of the use of the surf-board,
as civilization advances, may be accounted for by the increase
of modesty, industry or religion, without supposing, as some
have affected to believe, that missionaries caused oppressive
enactments against it.  These considerations are in part appli-
cable to many other amusements.  Indeed, the purchase of for-
eign vessels, at this time, required attention to the collecting
and delivering of 450,000 lbs. of sandal-wood, which those who
were waiting for it might naturally suppose would, for a time,
supersede their amusements.50
Another missionary who arrived in the 1820s, Rufus Ander-
son, concluded that property rights were central to the process of
civilization:
The government could not remain unchanged, and the people
become free and civilized.  The people must own property,
49 Id.  at 136.
50 Id.  at 137.
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have acknowledged rights, and be governed by written, well-
known, established laws.  This was far from their condition
before the year 1838.  The government was then a despotism.
The will of the king was law, his power absolute; and this was
true of the chiefs, also, in their separate spheres, so far as the
common people were concerned.  All right of property, in the
last resort, was with the king.  How were the people to attain
the true Christian position?  Obviously the rulers had duties to
learn and to perform, equally with the people; and the mis-
sionaries were the Christian teachers of both classes, with
God’s Word for their guide.51
In the minds of the missionaries and many other Americans,
Christianity, property rights, and the common law were closely
connected.  Each grew in conjunction with the other.  Accord-
ingly, the missionaries set as their goal the propagation of “Chris-
tian civilization.”  By that they meant the alteration of moral
character, which in turn meant establishing property rights.  Mis-
sionaries, then, were both advocates of the conversion to western
property holdings and among the leading commentators on Ha-
waii’s transformation of property rights.
Missionaries’ admiration of the market economy also contin-
ued into more recent scholarship.  Legal scholars and historians
from Bingham’s time until the late twentieth century frequently
praised the development of property rights in Hawaii.  For exam-
ple, Ralph S. Kuykendall’s 1938 book, The Hawaiian Kingdom
1778–1854:  Foundation and Transformation  presents a history of
the Great Mahele that locates it in a line of progress toward a
modern market economy.52  The most positive (though not very
positive) recent scholarly interpretation of the Great Mahele
comes in Stuart Banner’s article, Preparing to Be Colonized:
Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii .53
Banner sees the Great Mahele as a process of accommodation
between natives and colonizers in which the natives “prepare[d]
to be colonized” by adopting western patterns of landholding.54
51 RUFUS ANDERSON, THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS:  THEIR PROGRESS AND CONDI-
TION UNDER MISSIONARY LABORS 232 (3d ed., Boston, Gould & Lincoln 1865).
52 RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1778–1854:  FOUNDATION
AND TRANSFORMATION (1938).
53 See  Stuart Banner, Preparing to Be Colonized:  Land Tenure and Legal Strategy
in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii , 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273 (2005).
54 Id.  at 309.  Similarly, Sally Engle Merry depicts the increasing power of wes-
terners in the Hawaiian legal system in the years around the Mahele. SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI‘I:  THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW (2000); see also
JOCELYN LINNEKIN, SACRED QUEENS AND WOMEN OF CONSEQUENCE:  RANK, GEN-
DER, AND COLONIALISM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (1990).
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In more recent years, there has been an interpretive turn away
from praising the process of colonization and the development of
property rights that came along with it.  Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa’s
Native Land and Foreign Desires  sees the adoption of western
land holdings as a process of colonization.  In Kame‘eleihiwa’s
eyes, it was the combination of Christianity, the protection of
property, and capitalism that led to the undoing of Hawaiian cul-
ture.55  Other scholars identify similar patterns.56  Robert H.
Stauffer’s Kahana:  How the Land Was Lost ,57 recounting forfei-
ture of native lands in the late nineteenth century, and Noenoe
K. Silva’s Aloha Betrayed:  Native Hawaiian Resistance to Ameri-
can Colonialism ,58 which details natives’ protests against coloni-
zation in the 1890s, are both important representatives of the
dominant interpretation:  colonization led to loss of land and
other rights.
As further evidence of the process of colonization, one might
look to the immediate post-Mahele actions of the Hawaiian
courts.  In the 1858 case Oni v. Meek , the Hawaii Supreme Court
rejected a claim seeking pasturing rights based on pre-Mahele
tradition.59  Together, these scholarly interpretations suggest that
native rights were extinguished effectively, if not unjustly, in the
nineteenth century.  In the wake of Oni , it is hard to see what
native rights might have survived.
III
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
Recent cases tell a story of increasing respect for Native Ha-
waiian rights.  Building on the 1978 state constitution, which pro-
tects the rights of Native Hawaiians,60 the cases hearken back to
55 LILIKALĀ KAME‘ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES 174-78
(1992).
56 Mari Matsuda found, for instance, the growth of a western legal system in her
detailed study, Law and Culture in the District Court of Honolulu, 1844–1845:  A
Case Study of the Rise of Legal Consciousness , 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 16 (1988).
57 ROBERT H. STAUFFER, KAHANA:  HOW THE LAND WAS LOST (2004).
58 NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED:  NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO
AMERICAN COLONIALISM (2004).
59 2 Haw. 87, 95 (1858).
60 See HAW. CONST. art. 12, § 7 (“The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious pur-
poses and possessed by ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians
who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to
regulate such rights.”)
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the era before the Mahele and find native rights of access across
private property to reach beaches and harvest native foods.  They
also suggest that those rights continued, even if not always judi-
cially recognized, in the post-Mahele years.
These cases may in some ways have confirmed Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s 1904 decision about Hawaiian fishing rights in
Damon v. Hawaii .61 Damon  addressed the right to restrict the
taking of fish within a coral reef at Moanalua, Oahu.62  The plain-
tiff sought protection for his exclusive fishing right based on an
1846 Act, which provided that fishing rights within a coral reef
were the exclusive property of a landlord (and his tenants) who
owned land adjoining the reef.63  The plaintiff had purchased ad-
jacent land from the owner sometime after 1846.  The Organic
Act of the Territory of Hawaii, however, repealed all licenses for
fishing while leaving vested property rights intact.64  Therefore
the question became:  was Damon’s right akin to a license or
property?  Holmes acknowledged that the fishing rights were
strange; indeed, such a right was unknown at common law.65
However, Holmes found that the right
seems to be well known to Hawaii, and, if it is established,
there is no more theoretical difficulty in regarding it as prop-
erty and a vested right than there is regarding any ordinary
easement or profit a prendre  as such.  The plaintiff’s claim is
not to be approached as if it were something anomalous or
monstrous, difficult to conceive and more difficult to admit.
Moreover, however anomalous it is, if it is sanctioned by legis-
lation, if the statutes have erected it into a property right,
property it will be, and there is nothing for the courts to do
except to recognize it as a right.66
The Court concluded that the fishing right was, indeed, a vested
right and was not abrogated by the Organic Act.67
Damon  may derive from the Supreme Court’s concern for
property rights at the time.  However, it was also about the pro-
tection of Native Hawaiian rights and, as Hawaiian courts recog-
nized about the same time, the fact that there are local rights that
survived the missionaries’ law.  For instance, in holding that a
61 194 U.S. 154 (1904).
62 Id. at 157.
63 Id.  at 158-59.
64 Id.  at 157.
65 Id.  at 158.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 159-60.
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deed written in Hawaiian did not need to have the words
“heirs”68 to create a fee simple, the Supreme Court of the Terri-
tory of Hawaii stated:
The New Englanders who early settled here did not come as
a colony or take possession of these islands or bring their body
of laws with them, though they exercised a potent influence
upon the growth of law and government.  The ancient laws of
the Hawaiians were gradually displaced, modified and added
to.  The common law was not formally adopted until 1893 and
then subject to judicial precedents and Hawaiian national us-
age.  Prior to that time the courts were at first without statu-
tory suggestion as to what law they should follow in the
absence of statutes, and later were expressly permitted by stat-
ute to appeal to “natural law and reason, or to received usage,
and . . .  the laws and usages of other countries” and “to adopt
the reasonings and principles of the admiralty, maritime, and
common law of other countries, and also of the Roman or civil
law, so far as . . .  founded in justice, and not in conflict with
the laws and customs” of this country.  The courts usually fol-
lowed the common law when applicable.  But they felt free to
reject it, and did as a rule when, as in the present case, it was
based on conditions that no longer exist, and when it had
come to be generally recognized as merely technical and sub-
versive of justice or the intentions of the parties to instruments
and when it had in consequence been generally altered or ab-
rogated by statute elsewhere.69
The recent case law on Native Hawaiian rights has several key
features.  At its center is the right to cross private property, espe-
cially for beach access.  Second, these cases try to insure that no
more property is lost through adverse possession or partition.
The cases, beginning with Palama v. Sheehan in 1968,70 and run-
ning through Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.  in 1982,71 Pele Defense
Fund v. Paty  in 1992,72 and Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v.
Hawai‘i County Planning Commission  in 1995,73 are working to-
ward an understanding of the background rights of crossing land
for fishing, visiting the beach, and gathering food.
It is difficult to tell exactly where these cases are going and
what their limits will be.  Talk of community rights—or what is
68 That is, the court refused to apply the archaic rule that unless a grantor used
phrases like “and his heirs,” the grantee took only a life estate.  Branca v.
Makuakane, 13 Haw. 499, 500 (1901).
69 Id.  at 504-05 (citation omitted) (omissions in original).
70 440 P.2d 95 (Haw. 1968).
71 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
72 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992).
73 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995).
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increasingly known as individuals’ rights in the web of the com-
munity74—can, of course, quickly become a euphemism for abus-
ing the rights of the politically or economically weak.  But there
are some possibilities hiding in the shadows.
A. Native Hawaiian Rights:  Access and Harvesting Rights
Our modern story begins with the 1968 case Palama v.
Sheehan , which involved a controversy over the Palamas’ right to
cross a neighbor’s property in order to reach their small tracts of
land.75  The Palamas had crossed their neighbor’s land for de-
cades, ever since the land they owned had apparently been di-
vided from the land they crossed.  Perhaps, as the court stated,
the question could have been handled through finding an ease-
ment implied by necessity.76  But the court spent most of its time
talking about the Native Hawaiian right to cross land in order to
access taro patches and the ocean.77  The court took evidence of
the Palamas’ use of the property for such purposes and con-
cluded there “was sufficient evidence on which the trial court
could find that an ancient Hawaiian right of way through plain-
tiffs’ land existed and was used as such by [the Palamas’] prede-
cessors in title.”78
Upon reading this case with my class at the University of Ha-
waii School of Law in spring 2006, I asked why the court did not
just rest on the easement by necessity rather than get involved in
the complex issue of a Native Hawaiian right.  Elizabeth Wilcox,
who is from the island where the case arose, suggested that the
court had a particular desire to contribute to the resurrection of
Native Hawaiian rights.  I think she is right.  And as aloha juris-
prudence began to gather strength, it was recognized under the
name of judicial legislation and criticized as such.79
74 See  Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:  Property as
a Web of Interests , 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 331-63 (2002); see also  Joseph
William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Invest-
ments, and Just Obligations , 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314-25 (2006) (identify-
ing popular tropes of property ownership and the rights and obligations that go
along with them).
75 440 P.2d at 96.
76 Id.  at 98.
77 Id.  at 97-98.
78 Id.  at 98.
79 See, e.g. , J. Russell Cades, Judicial Legislation in the Supreme Court of Hawaii:
A Brief Introduction to the “Knowne Uncertaintie” of the Law , 7 HAW. B.J. 58, 65
(1970).
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But the process of common law evolution was rather slow.
Fourteen years later in Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co. , the Hawaii
Supreme Court faced a claim for access to property by William
Kalipi to go onto another’s land on the island of Molokai to
gather indigenous crops.80  Kalipi based the claim on Hawaii Re-
vised Statute section 7-1, which recognizes the rights of “tenants”
to access lands to take certain agricultural products for their own
use:
Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter ob-
tain, allodial titles to their lands, the people on each of their
lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood,
house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on
which they live, for their own private use, but they shall not
have a right to take such articles to sell for profit.  The people
shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water,
and the right of way.  The springs of water, running water, and
roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple;
provided that this shall not be applicable to wells and water-
courses, which individuals have made for their own use.81
The court interpreted the rights of people who lived in an
ahupuaa, a traditional division of property.82  These are pie-
shaped divisions of land that run from the coast to the moun-
tains.  Residents of each ahupuaa have the ability to access the
water as well as farmland within their ahupuaa.83  In dictum, the
court stated that those who lived within an ahupuaa had the right
to gather within that ahupuaa.84  But because Kalipi did not live
in the ahupuaa where he sought to gather, the court concluded
that he did not have a right to gather there.85
A decade later, in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty , the court dealt
with a case of a group who—like Kalipi—did not live in the
ahupuaa they sought to access.86  In Pele , the claim was based on
Hawaii Revised Statute section 1-1, which provides for the pres-
ervation of customary Hawaiian rights:
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and
American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the
State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by
80 656 P.2d 745, 747 (Haw. 1982).
81 HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (1993).
82 Kalipi , 656 P.2d at 747.
83 Id.  at 748-49 (citing In re  Boundaries of Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 239, 241 (1879)).
84 Id.  at 749.
85 Id.
86 837 P.2d 1247, 1271 (Haw. 1992).
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the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent,
or established by Hawaiian usage . . . .87
Thus, in Pele  the issue of right of access was divorced from resi-
dency on a particular ahupuaa.  The court held that there were
rights to access private property for “traditionally exercised sub-
sistence, cultural and religious practices” as long as the land had
not already been developed.88 Pele  thus presented an advance
from Kalipi by providing for a right of access, though its contours
are seemingly limited and certainly ambiguous.
The best-known case involving native rights is Public Access
Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai‘i County Planning Commission. 
Popularly known as PASH ,89 this case opens up some possibili-
ties for public rights to use private property. PASH  arose in a
strange posture:  a challenge to a construction permit for a hotel
along the shore on the island of Hawaii.90  The permit was chal-
lenged with the allegation that the building authority failed to
take adequate account of Native Hawaiian rights, such as the
right to access the shore.91  That naturally led the court to an in-
depth discussion of just what those rights are and how much they
should be protected.  As a preliminary matter, the court permit-
ted third parties to challenge the issuance of the permit.  From
there, it found that it was improper to permit building without
doing more to preserve rights of access to the shore.92  The court,
in essence, recognized an extensive right of access.93  In PASH ,
87 HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (1993).
88 Pele , 837 P.2d at 1273.
89 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995).
90 Id.  at 1250.
91 Id.  at 1251.
92 Id.  at 1273.
93 PASH  offers an alternative way of conceptualizing and protecting the right of
beach access, which has received a modest amount of court protection in New Jersey
and Oregon.  Other states that have protected beach access have done so on the
basis of public trust rationale. See, e.g. , Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,
471 A.2d 355, 364-66 (N.J. 1984); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456
(Or. 1993).  In Florida, one case from the early 1970s, which perhaps relied on aber-
rational senses left over from the 1960s about community rights to property, also
upheld the right of access based on a prescriptive easement. See  City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 81 (Fla. 1974); see also Gion v. City of
Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970), superceded by statute as stated in Friends of the
Trail v. Blasius, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 202 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding an implied dedica-
tion of plaintiff’s beach property to public use).  For further commentary, see Joseph
J. Kalo, The Changing Face of the Shoreline:  Public and Private Rights to the Natural
and Nourished Dry Sand Beaches of North Carolina , 78 N.C. L. REV. 1869 (2000).  I
shall leave analysis of what one might call “hippie jurisprudence” to another day,
though one might begin to mark out its contours (and limited utility to those who
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-3\ORE303.txt unknown Seq: 21  9-APR-07 14:34
2006] Aloha Jurisprudence:  Equity Rules in Property 791
the Hawai‘i County Planning Commission granted permission to
build a hotel along the beach; the “exaction” the Hawaii Su-
preme Court considered was permission for the public to cross
the hotel’s property.94
PASH ’s possibilities remain underdeveloped.  More than a
decade after the case was decided, it has been cited little and
relied upon even less.  Moreover, subsequent development in the
United States Supreme Court calls significant pieces of PASH
into question.  The relationship between PASH  and exactions
analysis is still somewhat unclear.  There may be a preexisting
right of access that is part of the background principles of prop-
erty law, which will allow restrictions on the right to exclude.
However, conditioning a right of building on the right of access
looks more like an exaction. PASH  did little more than cite two
exactions cases, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission95 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard ,96 before concluding that access to the
beach was protected by the Hawaii Constitution.97  Requiring ac-
cess in exchange for a building permit may pass scrutiny under
Nollan , which stated that there must be a nexus between a land
use grant and an exaction that is required in return for the
respect the rule of law) with Abbie Hoffman’s Steal This Book . ABBIE HOFFMAN,
STEAL THIS BOOK (1971), available at  http://www.tenant.net/Community/steal/
steal.html.
Along those lines, one might also look to In re Milton Hershey School Trust , 807
A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002), which affirmed a preliminary injunction against
sale of the trust’s controlling share of the Hershey Company.  The injunction was
premised in part on the “symbiotic relationship among the School, the community,
and the Company.” Id.  at 332.  The Hershey Company was essential to the town,
and its sale would have been devastating to the community. See  Mark Sidel, The
Struggle for Hershey:  Community Accountability and the Law in Modern American
Philanthropy , 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2003).  The case represents an instance of what
Joseph William Singer identified as “the reliance interest in property.”  Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property , 40 STAN. L. REV. 614, 622-23 (1987).
In the context of charitable trusts, we might refer to the concept as “the implied
trust beneficiary” or maybe “Quaker jurisprudence.” Cf.  Alfred L. Brophy, “In-
genium est Fateri per quos profeceris”:  Francis Daniel Pastorius’  Young Country
Clerk’s Collection and Anglo-American Legal Literature, 1682–1716 , 3 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 637 (1996) (discussing jurisprudence of early Pennsylvania and
its connections to Quaker religious thought).
94 903 P.2d at 1250, 1273.  The court concluded that “[i]n the instant case, the HPC
must consider PASH’s alleged customary rights on remand. . . . [I]f such rights are
established, the HPC will be obligated to protect them to the extent possible.  This
may involve the placement of conditions on Nansay’s permit to develop its land.”
Id.  at 1273.
95 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
96 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
97 903 P.2d at 1257-58, 1273.
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grant.98
There may be a right of access under Native Hawaiian rights
that existed since 1848.  But it is harder to see how that right,
which went for decades without being recognized, might now be
rediscovered.  It is especially troubling because a large amount of
property has been purchased with the understanding that those
rights did not exist.  Thus, under recent takings analysis, it is hard
to see how those rights survive.99
One might, of course, argue that aloha principles are back-
ground principles of property law, which define the rights of ex-
clusion.  However, that argument is increasingly difficult to
sustain.  Justice Kennedy seems to largely reject it in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island  when he wrote in response to the argument that
people who purchase property with land use restrictions should
not be entitled to challenge those restrictions.  There are echoes
of Jefferson’s statement that each generation must be able to free
itself from the contracts of previous generations100 in Kennedy’s
respinning, which provides that each generation of landowners
must be able to relook at land use restrictions.  Kennedy said:
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the
Lockean bundle.  The right to improve property, of course, is
subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, including
the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions.  The
98 483 U.S. at 837.
99 See  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (noting that “[f]uture
generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and
value of land”).
100 In Thomas Jefferson’s phrasing, it was the right of each generation to free itself
of past bargains:
The generations of men may be considered as bodies or corporations.
Each generation has the usufruct of the earth during the period of its con-
tinuance.  When it ceases to exist, the usufruct passes on to the succeeding
generation, free and unincumbered, and so on, successively, from one gen-
eration to another forever.  We may consider each generation as a distinct
nation, with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none
to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of another
country.  Or the case may be likened to the ordinary one of a tenant for
life, who may hypothecate the land for his debts, during the continuance of
his usufruct; but at his death, the reversioner (who is also for life only)
receives it exonerated from all burthen.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John W. Eppes (June 24, 1813), in  13 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269, 270 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh
eds., 1903).
In Justice Kennedy’s hands, the idea that we are not bound by past decisions be-
comes the right of individuals to challenge land use restrictions, though they have
failed in the past.
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Takings Clause, however, in certain circumstances allows a
landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the State’s
regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel
compensation.  Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new
zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting
a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all con-
cerned, other enactments are unreasonable and do not be-
come less so through passage of time or title.  Were we to
accept the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title
would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action
restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.
A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date
on the Takings Clause.  This ought not to be the rule.  Future
generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limi-
tations on the use and value of land.101
PASH  has received substantial attention and criticism on sev-
eral bases.  Professor Richard Epstein said of the decision in a
Honolulu Advertiser  opinion piece:
The inchoate value of the traditional gathering rights makes
planning difficult.  The underlying landowner would find it vir-
tually impossible to repurchase these rights from its diffuse
class of beneficiaries.  PASH’s admonition that regulatory au-
thorities give these inchoate rights “appropriate regulations”
introduces massive levels of uncertainty that negatively im-
pacts the development of Hawaiian lands, a high price to pay
in troubled economic times.
. . . .
. . . [T]he traditional western virtues of definiteness, consis-
tency and clarity are not birds of passage for some particular
culture, but guiding principles for the ages.102
There has been relatively little development since 1995; how-
ever, several cases suggest continued court concern with public
rights, even as the legislature is seeking to limit rights recognized
under PASH .103  One issue left open by PASH  was the nature of
rights of access on developed property.  The Hawaii Supreme
Court has begun to clarify this area through the case of State v.
101 Palazzolo , 533 U.S. at 627 (citation omitted).  This lends even further weight
to the argument in David L. Callies and J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy
Trends in Takings Law:  Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Excep-
tions” and the (Mis) Use of Investment-Backed Expectations , 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339
(2002).  See also  David Callies et al., Three Case Studies from Hawaii, Norway and
Greenland , in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43,
43-88 (Peter Ørebech et al. eds., 2005).
102 Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., Who Owns Property Rights? PASH Decision Re-
flects Worldwide Disputes , HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 22, 1997, at B3.
103 See  D. Kapua Sproat, Comment, The Backlash Against PASH:  Legislative At-
tempts to Restrict Native Hawaiian Rights , 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 321 (1998).
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Hanapi , which involved a trespass prosecution against Alapai
Hanapi, who claimed a right of access to his neighbor’s prop-
erty.104  Hanapi, a Native Hawaiian man, trespassed on the prop-
erty of his neighbor, Gary Galiher, to inspect repairs the
neighbor had done to the shoreline.105  When Hanapi refused to
leave, he was arrested.106  The Hawaii Supreme Court required
three elements to establish a Native Hawaiian easement to access
land:  (1) the claim must be by a Native Hawaiian; (2) access
must be for a recognized customary or traditional right; and (3)
the land had to be undeveloped (or at least not fully devel-
oped).107  In its analysis, the court concluded that Hanapi failed
to demonstrate that he was exercising a traditional right.108
In the 2004 case In re Wai‘ola O Moloka‘i, Inc. , the Hawaii
Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to preserve the
“community’s” fresh water rights.109  The public trust doctrine,
which in many ways is better developed in Oregon than Ha-
waii,110 holds the potential for a fairly flexible intellectual
grounding for the assertion of community rights.  Although the
modern origins of the public trust concept arose in the context of
a generous land sale from the people of Chicago to a railroad—
and thus might have reasonably been limited to the principle that
certain core public rights, like the right to eminent domain, may
not be alienated111—it has since grown to encompass public
104 970 P.2d 485, 486-87 (Haw. 1998).
105 Id.
106 Id.  at 487.
107 Id.  at 494-95.
108 The Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence that “‘stewardship’
or ‘restoration and healing of lands’” were traditional Hawaiian practices. Id.  at
495.  This is an important limitation.
109 83 P.3d 664, 693-94 (Haw. 2004).  Similarly, in Ka Pa‘akai O Ka‘Aina v. Land
Use Commission , 7 P.3d 1068, 1071 (Haw. 2000), the Hawaii Supreme Court dealt
with a claim that the state land use commission failed to adequately protect Native
Hawaiian use rights when it reclassified one thousand acres on the Island of Hawaii
from “conservation district” to “urban district.” Id. at 1071.  It affirmed a lower
court decision that the commission had made inadequate findings about the preser-
vation of Native rights and, therefore, ordered further hearings. Id.  at 1090.  This is
consistent with judicial scrutiny of government and private action that may deprive
natives of traditional rights.
110 Compare  State ex rel.  Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), with  David L.
Callies, Custom and Public Trust:  Background Principles of State Property Law? , 30
ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10017-19 (2000), Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom:
Allocating Space in Public Places , 79 TEMP. L. REV. 199, 220-22 (2006) (classifying
Native Hawaiian rights cases as custom cases), and  Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and
the Idea of the Public Trust , 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998).
111 Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill emphasize the limited origins of
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claims to beach access.112  In Hawaii, the most significant invoca-
tion of the public trust was in the 2000 case In re Water Use Per-
mit Applications .113  In that case, the Hawaii Supreme Court
broadly construed the public trust doctrine to reserve the state’s
right to groundwater.  The court noted that
the king’s reservation of his sovereign prerogatives respecting
water constituted much more than restatement of police powers,
rather we find that it retained on behalf of the people an interest
in the waters of the kingdom which the State has an obligation
to enforce  and which necessarily limited the creation of certain
private interests in waters.114
It concluded that groundwater, like surface waters, is governed
the public trust doctrine in The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine:  What
Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).  The idea of
inalienable public rights had some important adherents in the antebellum era. See,
e.g. , W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848) (finding right
of eminent domain inherent in contracts).  Justice Daniel’s rare majority opinion
presents a particularly positivist view of property rights and the inalienable powers
that are related to them:
Under every established government, the tenure of property is derived
mediately or immediately from the sovereign power of the political body,
organized in such mode or exerted in such way as the community or state
may have thought proper to ordain.  It can rest on no other foundation, can
have no other guarantee.  It is owing to these characteristics only, in the
original nature of tenure, that appeals can be made to the laws either for
the protection or assertion of the rights of property.  Upon any other hy-
pothesis, the law of property would be simply the law of force.  Now it is
undeniable, that the investment of property in the citizen by the govern-
ment, whether made for a pecuniary consideration or founded on condi-
tions of civil or political duty, is a contract between the state, or the
government acting as its agent, and the grantee; and both the parties
thereto are bound in good faith to fulfil it.  But into all contracts, whether
made between states and individuals or between individuals only, there
enter conditions which arise not out of the literal terms of the contract
itself; they are superinduced by the preëxisting and higher authority of the
laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong;
they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recog-
nized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into
express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force.  Every con-
tract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as
conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their execu-
tion shall occur.  Such a condition is the right of eminent domain.
Id. at 532-33.
112 See  Casey Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Exclusive Economic Zone ,
65 OR. L. REV. 1 (1986).
113 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000), aff’d in part & vacated in part , 93 P.3d 643 (Haw.
2004).
114 Id.  at 441.
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by public trust rather than title to the surrounding land.115
Also, recently the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed the line
where public beaches end and private property begins.116  The
court rejected a claim that landowners could plant vegetation be-
low the natural line of vegetation and thus claim additional prop-
erty.117  This holding reaffirms the principle announced in the
1973 case County of Hawaii v. Sotomura  that “[p]ublic policy . . .
favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Ha-
waii’s shoreline as is reasonably possible.”118
B. Respect for Native Hawaiian Property:  Limitations on
Adverse Possession
Beyond the well-known cases that explicitly protect certain
traditional rights to access property and harvest traditional crops,
there are other cases on the periphery of aloha jurisprudence.
Those cases cautiously protect the rights of Native Hawaiians by
ensuring due process before they are deprived of their property
rights by adverse possession.  Two cases warrant particular atten-
tion here.  The first is the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals’
opinion in Makila Land Co. v. Kapu , which took testimony on
the Hawaiian language as part of its investigation of the property
rights of a claimant’s predecessors.119  The second is Pioneer Mill
Co. v. Dow , which established a high standard for adverse pos-
session by cotenants and thus protected Native Hawaiians’ prop-
erty rights in co-owned property.120
Makila Land Company , which at the time of publication is on
remand, dealt with a claim to land owned by a man named Apaa,
who died in the late nineteenth century.121  In 1872, Momano,
who claimed to be Apaa’s son, wrote a lease conveying the land
to the West Maui Sugar Company.  At issue was how to translate
the word makuakane , which appeared in the lease:  did it mean
115 Id.  at 447; see also  Joseph L. Sax, Environment and Its Mortal Enemy:  The
Rise and Decline of the Property Rights Movement , 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 7 (2005).
This expansion of public rights contradicted earlier explicit precedent such as City
Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm’n , 30 Haw. 912 (1929).
116 Diamond v. State, 145 P.3d 704 (Haw. 2006).
117 Id.  at 719.
118 Id.  at 716 (quoting County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Haw.
1973)).
119 No. 25875, 2006 WL 1118890, at *10-11 (Haw. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2006).
120 978 P.2d 727 (Haw. 1999).
121 2006 WL 1118890, at *2.
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“father” or “other male relative”?122  If it was the former, then
Momano was the sole intestate heir, and he had title to the land
that he conveyed in 1893 to the sugar company, which was the
predecessor to the Makila Land Company (MLC).  The claim-
ants, Apaa’s heirs and descendants, presented advanced genea-
logical charts, which suggested that Momano was not Apaa’s son
but rather was at best a cotenant, not the sole owner of the
property.123
The court overturned a summary judgment in favor of MLC
and, thus, revived the case.124  Nevertheless, the claimants have a
long way to go.  The court did not rule on whether the claim was
barred by adverse possession.  However, one likely defense
against a claim of adverse possession by MLC will be that it is
very hard to adversely possess against a cotenant.  That argument
would rely on Pioneer Mill Co. v. Dow .
Pioneer Mill Co. v. Dow , decided by the Hawaii Supreme
Court in 1999, provides some hope for those who claim they in-
herited land even though the people they claim through have not
occupied the land for decades.125 Pioneer Mill  involved a claim
by the heirs of Kahoomaeha Phillips that they owned property
occupied by Pioneer Mill.126  The heirs claimed that at the time
of Kahoomaeha’s death in 1864, she was a cotenant with a fifty
percent share of the estate that she inherited from her deceased
husband, Thomas Phillips.127  The other cotenant was John
White, the brother of Thomas’s first wife.  In 1867, however, a
probate court ruled that Kahoomaeha was the sole owner of the
property.128  But Kahoomaeha’s heirs—her daughter and grand-
son had life estates and P. Nahaolelua held the remainder—
seemed to have never occupied the property.  Further, by 1878
John White leased the property before selling it in 1880.129
Through a series of intermediate conveyances, it came into the
hands of the Pioneer Mill in 1924.130  Pioneer Mill defended
against Kahoomaeha’s heirs’ claim to the property by countering
122 Id.  at *4-5.
123 Id.  at *5-7.
124 Id.  at *16.
125 978 P.2d at 738-39.
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that it had been in its exclusive possession since the 1920s and
that none of the heirs had been on the property since the middle
of the nineteenth century.131  One might usually think that such
long-term use was sufficient to establish a claim of adverse pos-
session to the property.  In fact, on the basis of adverse posses-
sion, the trial court did grant Pioneer Mill’s motion for summary
judgment, which argued that it had “openly, notoriously, contin-
uously and exclusively used the land.”132
Although the intermediate court of appeals accepted Pioneer
Mill’s argument, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed because Pi-
oneer Mill did not meet its high burden of showing by clear and
positive proof that it adversely possessed the property.133  Ad-
verse possession against a cotenant is notoriously difficult to es-
tablish.  Because each cotenant is entitled to occupy the
property, courts typically say that there is ouster only when one
cotenant seeks to be on the property and is excluded.134  The
court reached back to nineteenth-century precedent and more
recent cases to hold that if the initial occupation is permissive,
then there is a presumption of continued permissive occupation
“until such time as the adverse claimant shows, by words or acts
sufficient to give notice to the contrary to an ordinarily prudent
and vigilant owner, that he, she, or it, the adverse claimant, had
changed its character and was thereafter occupying adversely.”135
The court held that because the original co-ownership was be-
tween family members, the alleged adverse possession by White
and his successors, including Pioneer Mill, did not initially meet
the requirement of hostile possession.136  Pioneer Mill could still
rebut that presumption, but it needed to show evidence other
than long-term occupation to do so.  Essentially, the court re-
quired some additional act or words by the adverse possessor (in
this case Pioneer Mill) to make the possession hostile rather than
131 Id.  at 736.
132 Id.  at 730-31.
133 Id.  at 735-36.
134 See, e.g. , Ex parte  Walker, 739 So. 2d 3, 7 (Ala. 1999) (requiring evidence of
actual ouster and actual notice of the ouster); City & County of Honolulu v. Ben-
nett, 552 P.2d 1380, 1390 (Haw. 1976) (imposing “actual notice” standard on coten-
ant who sought to adversely possess land from a fellow cotenant).
135 Pioneer Mill , 978 P.2d at 738.  In this discussion, the court cited Smith v.
Hamakua Mill Co. , 15 Haw. 648, 657 (1904); Dowsett v. Maukeala , 10 Haw. 166, 168
(1895); Tindle v. Linville , 512 P.2d 176, 178 (Okla. 1973); and Johnson v.
Szumowicz , 179 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Wyo. 1947).
136 Pioneer Mill , 978 P.2d at 731-32.
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permissive.137  This ruling looks like aloha spirit in action.138
Pioneer Mill  builds on other adverse possession cases that im-
pose a high standard for notice to cotenants.  For example, the
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals in Hustace v. Kapuni re-
quired an adverse possessor to offer evidence of his or her dili-
gence in attempting to notify absent cotenants.139  The court
suggested that it might require a claimant to visit the state
archives to look for genealogical information on the identities of
absent cotenants before it would allow notice by mere publica-
tion.140  That position was reaffirmed in 1999 by the Hawaii In-
termediate Court of Appeals in Petran v. Allencastre .141
Courts and litigants are thus increasingly scrutinizing transac-
tions of long ago.  The Hawaiian courts are revisiting what
caused land loss, just as historians like Stuart Banner, Lilikalā
Kame‘eleihiwa, and Robert Stauffer are revisiting the process as
well.142  Aloha jurisprudence has a lot of possibilities, though as
of yet it is underdeveloped.
C. Legislative Redistribution of Property
The aloha spirit is not confined to the courts.  The Hawaii leg-
islature’s desire to provide land for a wider segment of the popu-
lation was what led the Hawaii Housing Authority to enact the
137 Id.  at 737-38.
138 A number of jurisdictions, of course, protect rights of cotenants from adverse
possession by cotenants.  See, e.g. , Ex parte Walker , 739 So. 2d at 3; Helen Bishop
Jenkins, A Study of the Intersection of DNA Technology, Exhumation and Heirship
Determination as It Relates to Modern-Day Descendants of Slaves in America , 50
ALA. L. REV. 39 (1998).
139 718 P.2d 1109, 1116 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986).
140 Id.  at 1115.
141 985 P.2d 1112, 1123 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (looking back to a record of an 1860
conveyance to thirteen cotenants to find a material question of fact as to whether a
party claiming title by adverse possession has reason to “suspect the existence of a
co-tenancy”). Petran  was filed pro se.
The United States Supreme Court’s five-four decision in Jones v. Flowers  in the
spring of 2006 raised again the problems of notice by publication.  126 S. Ct. 1708
(2006).  In Flowers , the Court found notice by publication insufficient before the tax
sale of property; however, the close vote as well as a strong dissent by Justice Clar-
ence Thomas reminds us that many are willing to allow only minimal notice. See id.
at 1723-27.  Justice Thomas concluded, for instance, that “the methods of notice . . .
were reasonably calculated to inform petitioner of proceedings affecting his prop-
erty interest and thus satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Id.  at
1722.  Justice Thomas’s calculation looked at the likely effect, rather than the end
result, of the notification process.
142 See KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra  note 55; STAUFFER, supra  note 57; Banner, supra
note 53.
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Land Reform Act of 1967, which permitted tenants to petition to
purchase the property they leased.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff  emphasizes the antifeudal,
equalitarian nature of the Act.  She adopts an understanding of
history that in the years before outside contact, the natives had a
feudal property system:
The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian
immigrants from the western Pacific.  These settlers developed
an economy around a feudal land tenure system in which one
island high chief, the ali‘i nui, controlled the land and assigned
it for development to certain subchiefs.  The subchiefs would
then reassign the land to other lower ranking chiefs, who
would administer the land and govern the farmers and other
tenants working it.  All land was held at the will of the ali‘i nui
and eventually had to be returned to his trust.  There was no
private ownership of land.143
There was extraordinary concentration in landholding.  For in-
stance, on the most populous island, Oahu (where Honolulu is
located), twenty-two owners “owned 72.5% of the fee simple ti-
tles.”144  The opposition to feudalism was an important (or at
least rhetorical) basis for Justice O’Connor’s support for the Act:
The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of
the original 13 Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social
and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their
monarchs.  The land oligopoly has, according to the Hawaii
Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the normal func-
tioning of the State’s residential land market and forced
thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy,
the land underneath their homes.  Regulating oligopoly and
the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s po-
lice powers.145
The legislature’s action is subject to the criticism that it was
providing additional rights to non-Native Hawaiians at the ex-
pense of trusts that own land and rent it out for the benefit of
Native Hawaiians:  that it was, in essence, effecting yet another
transfer from the Native Hawaiians to others.146  The Act ex-
143 Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
144 Id.
145 Id.  at 241-42.  In a footnote, O’Connor continued:  “After the American
Revolution, the colonists in several States took steps to eradicate the feudal inci-
dents with which large proprietors had encumbered land in the Colonies.  Courts
have never doubted that such statutes served a public purpose.” Id.  at 241-42 n.5
(citations omitted).
146 See SAMUEL KING & RANDALL ROTH, BROKEN TRUST:  GREED, MISMANAGE-
MENT AND POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA’S LARGEST CHARITABLE TRUST
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presses the legislature’s desire to provide additional rights to
members of the community, though perhaps not the community
members most in need.  There are other protections for Native
Hawaiian rights, such as the Department of Hawaii Home
Lands—an agency which provides homestead rights to Native
Hawaiians.147
One can also draw some inferences about the contours of
aloha jurisprudence from the articles and comments that appear
(2006).  Paul Carrington asks critical questions about what he sees as the Bishop
Trust’s drift from the purposes established by Princess Pauahi’s 1883 will. See  Paul
D. Carrington, Testamentary Incorrectness:  A Review Essay , 54 BUFF. L. REV. 693,
712-15 (2006) (reviewing KING & ROTH, supra).  Carrington highlights the integra-
tionist impulses behind Princess Pauahi’s will. Id.  at 699 (“[Princess Pauahi] aimed
. . . to facilitate integration of Hawaiians and other impoverished children into a
peaceful, polychromatic, Protestant, industrious society.”).  He asks, in particular,
questions about the Hawaii courts’ treatment of trust law:
Were the court and the trustees sufficiently faithful to Pauahi’s will? . . .
Perhaps the circumstances have changed sufficiently since 1884 to justify an
application of the doctrine of cy pres allowing the trustees to depart from
the testator’s integrationist aims.  Or might the equitable doctrine of devia-
tion be appropriately applied to liberate benign trustees from the dead
hand of a testatrix who did not foresee the conditions of the twenty-first
century?  Or should the Rule Against Perpetuities have some application
to terminate the influence of the dead hand?  Perhaps one or all of these
principles might apply if the testator’s aims were indeed politically incor-
rect, but they might be deemed to require an overt statement by the trust-
ees explaining their departure and the reasons for it, and requiring
conformity to her aims as near as may be consistent with the constitutional
constraints.
Id.  at 712-13 (footnotes omitted).
For a somewhat different interpretation of the Princess’ will, see Judge Robert
Mahealani M. Seto & Lynne Marie Kohm, Of Princesses, Charities, Trustees, and
Fairytales:  A Lesson of the Simple Wishes of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop , 21 U.
HAW. L. REV. 393 (1999).
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Kamehameha Schools’ preference
for Native Hawaiians.  It relied in part on Congress’ 1993 apology for the federal
government’s role in depriving Native Hawaiians of sovereignty. See  Doe v.
Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estates, 470 F.3d 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing Act of Nov. 23, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510).  This piece of aloha
jurisprudence seeks to restore a piece of Native Hawaiian self-determination. See
generally  Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People , 17
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95 (1998).  The court’s use of the apology is one practical
effect of the growing apologies for past injustice. See  Alfred L. Brophy, Some Con-
ceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery , 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 497, 500-01 (2003).
147 See  Shanda A.K. Liu, Native Hawaiian Homestead Water Reservation Rights:
Providing Good Living Conditions for Native Hawaiian Homesteaders , 25 U. HAW.
L. REV. 85 (2002); Timothy Hurley, Receiving Homestead ‘Like Being in Las Vegas,’
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 7, 2005, at B1; Department of Hawaiian Homelands
Page, http://www.hawaii.gov/dhhl.
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in the University of Hawaii Law Review .148  Those works, di-
rected largely to the Hawaii legal community, provide more evi-
dence of what lawyers in Hawaii believe the courts and
legislature are doing and where aloha jurisprudence is headed.
Another way of understanding the contours of aloha jurispru-
dence is to look to critics of the Hawaii legislature.  One critic
charges that if the Hawaii legislature’s “abuses and misinterpre-
tations continue, the sticks in the ‘bundle of rights’ we presently
know as private property may soon cease to exist.”149  There is,
moreover, concern among opponents of Pele Defense Fund v.
Paty  that it will be read broadly and perhaps inconsistently with
the United States Constitution’s respect for property rights.150
148 See, e.g. , Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands:  Still
a Good Idea—and Constitutional , 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 331 (2005); Heidi Kai Guth,
Comment, Dividing the Catch:  National Resource Reparations to Indigenous Peo-
ples—Examining the Maori Fisheries Settlement , 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 179 (2001);
Robert Heckel, Recent Development, The Manoa Valley Special District Ordinance:
Community-Based Planning in the Post-Lucas Era , 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 449 (1997);
Ian H. Hlawati, Comment, Loko i‘a:  A Legal Guide to the Restoration of Native
Hawaiian Fishponds Within the Western Paradigm , 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 657 (2002);
Isaac Moriwake, Comment, Critical Excavations:  Law, Narrative, and the Debate on
Native American and Hawaiian “Cultural Property” Repatriation , 20 U. HAW. L.
REV. 261 (1998); Daniel G. Mueller, Comment, The Reassertion of Native Hawaiian
Gathering Rights Within the Context of Hawai‘i’s Western System of Land Tenure , 17
U. HAW. L. REV. 165 (1995); Damon Schmidt, Recent Development, Wiping Out the
Ban on Surfboards at Point Panic , 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 303 (2004).  Parts of aloha
jurisprudence are also explored in other journals. See, e.g. , Jocelyn B. Garovoy, “Ua
Koe ke Kuleana o na Kānaka” (Reserving the Rights of Native Tenants):  Integrating
Kuleana Rights and Land Trust Priorities in Hawaii , 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 523
(2005); Neil M. Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights , 63 CAL. L. REV. 848 (1975)
(emphasizing a statutory solution to Native Hawaiian property claims); Kahikino
Noa Dettweiler, Comment, Racial Classification or Cultural Identification?:  The
Gathering Rights Jurisprudence of Two Twentieth Century Hawaiian Supreme Court
Justices , 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 174 (2005), http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/
v6.01_Chaney.pdf.
149 Jennifer M. Young, Comment, The Constitutionality of a Naked Transfer:
Mandatory Lease-to-Fee Conversion’s Failure to Satisfy a Requisite Public Purpose in
Hawai‘i Condominiums , 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 561, 592 (2003).
150 See, e.g. , Paul M. Sullivan, Customary Revolutions:  The Law of Custom and
the Conflict of Traditions in Hawai‘i , 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 99, 117-22, 144-45 (1998)
(focusing on the limitations of customary rights in light of Oni v. Meek , 2 Haw. 87
(1858)); Gina M. Watumull, Comment, Pele Defense Fund v. Paty:  Exacerbating the
Inherent Conflict Between Hawaiian Native Tenant Access and Gathering Rights and
Western Property Rights , 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 207, 224, 255 (1994).  Sullivan dates
the emergence of what I call aloha jurisprudence to Application of Ashford , 440
P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968), which interpreted the Hawaiian word “ma ke kai” in a deed as
meaning the vegetation line rather than the mean high tide line.  Sullivan, supra , at
127. As a result waterfront property owners were deprived of a parcel of land they
thought they had owned for fifty years, while the public’s right in shores was ex-
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There are yet other indicators of a political commitment to aloha
jurisprudence including the Hawaiian sovereignty movement,
which is interested in the preservation of Hawaiian culture and
even the reclamation of Hawaiian sovereignty.  While that move-
ment has not always been successful, it is a reminder that rights
are defined by people.  Much as the abolitionist movement criti-
qued the legal system and sought to replace it with another juris-
prudence based on sentiment, the Hawaiian rights movement
seeks an alternative to western property holding.
The movement has had some victories, however, such as the
recent decision of the University of Hawaii to convert patent
rights in genetically modified taro, a staple of the Native Hawai-
ian diet, into common rights.151  At other times, one can discern
the contours of aloha jurisprudence from the writings of Hawai-
ian legal scholars such as Mari Matsuda,152 Melody Kapilialoha
MacKenzie,153 Kaimipono Wenger,154 and Eric Yamamoto.155
panded.  There are, of course, contrary opinions as well. See, e.g. , Sotomura v.
County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 479-80 (D. Haw. 1978) (concluding that public
use of beach had not ripened into customary right).
Sullivan concludes that “[t]he application of [Hawaii Revised Statute sections 5-
7.5, the “aloha statute”] in future cases concerning real property rights will undoubt-
edly be watched with gleeful anticipation by legal scholars both in Hawai‘i and in
other common law jurisdictions, but must surely be a source of anxiety to develop-
ers, other property owners in Hawai‘i and investors.”  Sullivan, supra , at 154 (foot-
note omitted).
151 See, e.g. , Press Release, Univ. of Haw., UH Files Terminal Disclaimer on Taro
Patents (June 20, 2006), available at http://manoa.hawaii.edu/mco/pdf/
taro_resolution_release.pdf.
The dispute is discussed in Paul Elias, Who Owns Taro? , HONOLULU STAR-BUL-
LETIN, Jan. 21, 2006, at C2; Jan TenBruggencate, UH Expected to Abandon Contro-
versial Taro Patents , HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 20, 2006, at A1; Stewart Yerton,
Biotech Brouhaha:  Some Native Hawaiian Leaders Harbor Concerns About Devel-
oping the State’s Life Science Industries , HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, July 24, 2005,
at D1.
152 See, e.g. , Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations , 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of
America:  Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Recon-
struction , 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
153 See, e.g. , NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha Mac-
Kenzie ed., 1991).  One might also think along these lines of Carl Christensen’s work
on Hawaiian legal history. See, e.g. , Posting of Carl C. Christensen to PropertyProf
Blog, It’s Not About the Fox; Sometimes, It’s About the Whale, http://lawprofes-
sors.typepad.com/property/2006/08/its_not_about_t.html (Aug. 28, 2006).
154 See, e.g. , Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery
Reparations Debate , 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 279 (2006).
155 See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE:  CONFLICT AND RECON-
CILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race
Praxis:  Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America ,
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Perhaps there are some opportunities for similar approaches in
other jurisdictions, which might include an expanded public trust
doctrine.  Or maybe there are even some other implied rights of
access to sacred places elsewhere in the Hawaiian islands, such as
grave sites.156
D. Injunctions and Property Rights:  The Case of Covenants
Even outside of the Native Hawaiian rights context, there is
further evidence of deference to community rights over individ-
ual property rights.  That conflict appears starkly when courts
contemplate injunctions:  should they protect a property right
created by a covenant, easement, or fee simple through a grant of
an injunction or only through a damages award?  This is a diffi-
cult case, because invocations of what constitutes the benefit of
the “community” are notoriously difficult to gauge and confine.
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s 1972 article, Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:  One View of the Ca-
thedral , established the language for discussing the choice
between an injunction and damages as the difference between
property rules (the enforcement of a property interest through
an injunction) and liability rules (the protection of the property
right through damages).157  Depending on the equities, the prop-
erty rule may shift to a liability rule—what Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomovsky call, rather creatively, a “pliability
rule.”158
What interests us here are the instances in which courts apply a
liability rule rather than a property rule or when courts shift, to
95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:  Japanese
American Redress and African American Claims , 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477
(1998).
156 For a consideration of the importance of sacred sites on Oahu, see PANA
O‘AHU:  SACRED STONES, SACRED LAND (Jan Becket & Joseph Singer eds., 1999).
Along these lines, one might consider the right of relatives of a person buried on
private property to visit the grave. See  Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters:  The An-
cient Rights of the Graveyard , 2006 BYU L. REV. 1469.
157 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral , 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  Among
the extraordinary range of responses for Calabresi and Melamed, one might look to
the recent literature, including Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the
Law of Nuisance , 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004) and Henry E. Smith, Property and
Property Rules , 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004).
158 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules , 101 MICH. L. REV. 1,
38 (2002) (exploring changing equities in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. , 257
N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)).
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borrow Bell and Parchomovsky’s analysis, from property to lia-
bility rules.  The way courts get to that decision is through appli-
cation of a set of “equity rules.”  Courts decide between a
property rule and a liability rule based on a balance of factors,
including the culpability of the parties and the interests of third
parties.159
Injunctions are often discussed in the context of nuisance.  In
nuisance cases, courts balance the equities of the harm to the
tortfeasor with the benefit to those whose property is interfered
with if the courts were to grant relief.160  But courts typically
deny injunctions only when there is an extraordinary imbalance
between the harm to the tortfeasor’s interest and the benefit to
the people whose rights are infringed.161
The classic example of this is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co. ,162 which juxtaposes the rights of the community to employ-
ment at a cement plant against the rights of neighbors whose
property was being polluted by the plant.  Although the court
said it was upholding the traditional New York doctrine that a
party injured by nuisance is entitled to an injunction, it ultimately
allowed the cement plant to pay the neighbors damages, because
the court believed such a solution “seems to do justice between
the contending parties.”163  The balancing process for injunctions
is one of the mediating doctrines that allow courts to act in a
fashion that protects the rights of the community against a holder
of property rights.
There is no necessary class preference imbedded in these
159 For one example of the balancing and considerations of culpability, one might
compare Boomer , 257 N.E.2d at 870, with Ariola v. Nigro , 156 N.E.2d 536 (Ill. 1959)
(requiring removal of a portion of a building that infringed on neighbor’s property
by a few inches), and Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enterprises , 492
N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1986) (denying request for specific performance of a contract in
part because of the imposition of hardships that the contract would impose).
160 See, e.g. , Boomer , 257 N.E.2d at 873-75.
161 See, e.g. , Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (granting injunction even though the cost of the injunction to the de-
fendants exceeded by several times the benefit of the injunction to plaintiffs).  There
is a rich history of injunctions and considerations of equity still waiting to be ex-
plored. See, e.g. , MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780–1860, at 74 (1977) (citing Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38
Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1839) (denying a nuisance injunction based on the importance of
a railroad)).  Some pieces of the history appear in Robert G. Bone, Normative The-
ory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law:  1850 to 1920 , 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1101 passim (1986).
162 Boomer , 257 N.E.2d 870.
163 Id.  at 873.
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choices, for the property owner whose rights are subordinated
may be wealthy or poor.  However, in some high-profile cases,
the property owners who are left with only damages instead of
injunctions were relatively poor.164  Accordingly, we may be left
with the sense that equitable balancing leaves neighboring (and
often relatively poor) property owners with fewer rights than if
they had received an injunction.165  Nevertheless, courts turn to
equity rules to decide whether to grant injunctive relief (a prop-
erty right) or limit relief to money (a liability rule) as a way of
apportioning rights between these competing considerations.  In
some cases beyond injunctions, courts turn to equitable consider-
ations to begin the assignment of property rights through adverse
possession or in deciding whether to grant a prescriptive
easement.166
Most property courses fail to discuss the circumstances when
the beneficiaries of covenants might not be entitled to enforce
them through injunctions.  Those issues are often reserved for
remedies courses.167  Property students do, however, often study
equitable rights in regard to easements.  Many study Brown v.
Voss , a Washington Supreme Court case that denied the right of
exclusion to a servient estate where the dominant estate holder
was overusing the easement.168  In Brown , the holders of the
dominant estate crossed the servient estate to get to their prop-
164 See, e.g. , Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing  Boomer:  Justice, Efficiency, and Nui-
sance Law , in  PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOHN E. CRIBBET 7, 8-12 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988) (discussing
Boomer litigation).
165 See  Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies:  Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Startling Rules , 106 YALE L.J. 2149 app. at 2173 (1997) (summarizing remedies).
166 See, e.g. , R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent , 61 WASH.
U. L.Q. 331 (1983) (suggesting that courts turn to equitable principles, like inno-
cence, when deciding whether to award property to an adverse possessor); Thomas
W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession , 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1122 (1985) (proposing a compromise that after the expiration of the statute of
limitations, adverse possessors should be allowed to keep property but have to pay
for it).
167 ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITABLE REME-
DIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 748-51 (7th ed. 2005), for instance, includes Tur-
pin v. Watts , 607 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), which denied an injunction
for violation of a restrictive covenant in part because “the relief sought is wholly
disproportionate to the injury sustained.” See also  Lawrence Berger, A Policy Anal-
ysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land , 55 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1970).
168 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986), reprinted in A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND
TEXT ON PROPERTY 939 (5th ed. 2004); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 716
(6th ed. 2006).
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erty and other property beyond the dominant estate.169  Yet, the
trial court denied an injunction against the overuse.170  It found,
and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, that:  (1) the hold-
ers of the dominant estate acted reasonably in developing the
property; (2) the holders of the servient estate were not harmed
by the overuse, and there was no increase in traffic; (3) the servi-
ent estate owners had sat on their rights for a year while the
dominant estate holders expended money; and (4) the servient
estate sought the injunction for purposes of leveraging a settle-
ment.171  How many of those findings were necessary—or even
important—for the denial of injunctive relief is an important
question.  Laches and the balancing of equities were undoubtedly
important factors.  What is somewhat more puzzling is the court’s
invocation of the finding that the injunction would be used as
leverage in negotiations.  That is, one suspects, precisely the
point of many injunctions.172
A central factor in deciding whether to grant injunctions to
preserve property rights is the balancing of equities, which in-
cludes the interests of the community.173  In this analysis we look
to several subfactors:  (1) the culpability of the persons seeking
an injunction, that is, whether they mislead the defendants into
violating property rights;174 (2) the culpability of the defendants,
for example, whether the defendants knowingly violated the
169 715 P.2d at 515-16.
170 Id.  at 518.
171 Id.
172 Another case sometimes studied in property courses is Umphres v. J.R. Mayer
Enterprises, Inc. , 889 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (denying relocation of ease-
ment because of inequity), reprinted in CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
PROPERTY:  LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 688-92 (4th ed. 1997).  A case of increasing
popularity with property professors, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. , 563 N.W.2d
154 (Wis. 1997), awarded only nominal damages for a one-time trespass but re-
manded for further consideration of exemplary damages.  Exemplary damages offer
a possible midpoint between injunctions and an award of only nominal damages.
173 Eric Freyfogle has called these considerations issues of “context and accom-
modation.” See  Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property
Law , 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530-31 (1989).  Thus, Professor Freyfogle sees prop-
erty as increasingly representing overlapping interests.  He suggests that property
may “increasingly exist as a collection of use-rights, rights defined in specific con-
texts and in terms of similar rights held by other people.  Property use entitlements
will be phrased in terms of responsibilities and accommodations rather than rights
and autonomy.” Id.  at 1531.
174 See Holbrook v. Taylor , 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976), an equitable estoppel case,
which illustrates one way that courts invoke equity to deny injunctive relief against a
property owner.
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plaintiffs’ property rights or did so unknowingly;175 (3) the bal-
ance of the hardships between the plaintiffs and defendants;176
and (4) the community’s interest in the continued violation, that
is, whether there are jobs or other important interests at stake.177
Still, even with those equity rules, it is difficult to predict when
a court will apply a strict property rule as opposed to a more
lenient liability rule.178  As Cornell Law Professor Emily Sherwin
notes, “The absence of rules for judicial choice among remedies
means that property rules and liability rules, as imposed by
courts, have only a limited prospective role in law.”179
The predictability of equity rules may be higher in Hawaii than
in other jurisdictions.  Or, put differently, the choice of liability
rules seems to be governed by equitable principles that allow
community members to have broad powers.  The Hawaii Su-
preme Court faced these issues in the 1999 case Pelosi v. Wailea
Ranch Estates .180  Angelo Pelosi complained that a parcel adjoin-
ing his home was being used to provide access to another subdi-
vision, even though the parcel was burdened with a restrictive
covenant limiting its use to single-family residential purposes.181
The Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged that the lot was, in-
deed, used for a purpose prohibited under the covenant; how-
ever, the court balanced the interests at stake.  It looked at the
interests of the twenty families who purchased property in the
subdivision without any knowledge of the covenant and whose
only way into their homes was over the parcel.182  The balanc-
ing—following what one might call equity rules—led to the
court’s invocation of a liability rule, rather than the assignment
of an absolute right to enjoin offending use of the property.
Such complex balancing includes the right of the community.
175 See, e.g. , Sandstrom v. Larsen, 583 P.2d 971 (Haw. 1978) (affirming an injunc-
tion for a violation of a restrictive covenant in light of the fact that the defendant
proceeded despite knowledge that there might be a covenant violation).
176 See, e.g. , ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES:  CASES AND PROBLEMS 62
(3d ed. 2002).
177 See, e.g. , United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
178 See Emily Sherwin, Introduction:  Property Rules as Remedies , 106 YALE L.J.
2082, 2086 (1997); see also, e.g. , Peters v. Archambault, 278 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1972)
(ordering—without considering the balancing of interests—the removal of a build-
ing that encroached on a neighbor’s property).  I am indebted to Professor Charles
Donahue for suggesting Peters .
179 Sherwin, supra note 178, at 2086.
180 985 P.2d 1045 (Haw. 1999).
181 Id.  at 1049-50.
182 Id.  at 1055-56.
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While scholars rarely talk about it,183 whether there is an injunc-
tion or not has important implications for protection of property.
Richard Epstein phrases the central part of property as the right
of ownership and exclusion.  If a court can take something away
by simply paying for it, it cannot be property.  As Epstein says,
“Property is something that is mine, and it cannot be mine if you
can take it at your free will and pleasure.”184  Epstein also argues
in favor of property rules even when bargaining is not feasible.185
Accordingly, aloha jurisprudence seems to prefer fewer property
rights and more community rights, which seems to be facilitated
by the restriction of less costly liability rules.186  As Lewinsohn-
Zahmir states, “Liability rules . . . remove the owner’s holdout
power.”187  They dramatically decrease the entitlement of the
183 They are more concerned with the circumstances in which we should assign a
property owner the right to an injunction.
184 Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral:  The Dominance of Prop-
erty Rules , 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2106 (1997).
185 Id.  at 2094-95. See also  Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Prop-
erty Rules and Liability Rules Revisited:  Critical Observations from Behavioral Stud-
ies , 80 TEX. L. REV. 219, 221 (2001).
186 But, as Carl Christensen has suggested, one might also see Pelosi  as a betrayal
of aloha.  E-mail from Carl C. Christensen, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law,
Univ. of Haw., to author (Aug. 17, 2006) (on file with author).  As Christensen
points out, the individual purchasers would have “their remedies in contract against
Wailea Ranch Estates for failure to convey marketable title and against their title
insurers, who should have been able to figure out these lots didn’t have proper legal
access.” Id.
The definition of community is, of course, central to the considerations here.
Christensen joins other commentators, like Morton Horwitz, in construing a utilita-
rian balancing (which permits those with more at stake economically to prevail) as
representative of a legal system that prefers commerce over individuals. See, e.g. ,
HORWITZ, supra  note 161, at 102.  As Horwitz has stated:
[I]n a second stage which crystalized by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, property law had come largely to be based on a set of reciprocal rights
and duties whose enforcement required courts to perform the social engi-
neering function of balancing the utility of economically productive activity
against the harm that would accrue.
Id.
In fact, central to Horwitz’s “transformation” is a remaking of property rights to
protect those who will most promote the goals of economic growth.  There contin-
ues, of course, to be strong strands of vested rights over “dynamic” (or use) rights.
That conflict appears most clearly in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge , 36 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 420 (1837). See text accompanying supra notes 18-19.  The utilitarian bal-
ancing illustrates how difficult it is to make assessments of the character of changes
in legal thought.  A decision like Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate , 38 Ky. (8
Dana) 289 (1839), which found no nuisance by a railroad running through Louisville,
Kentucky, illustrates the balancing of collective property interests and corporate
property interests that frequently takes place.
187 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 185, at 226.
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owner, and in some instances the damages are small.188  Without
an injunction—and without the holdout power—there may be lit-
tle or no recovery by the owner.189
As we decrease the likelihood of injunctions, we decrease indi-
viduals’ property rights.  Courts and legislatures have, through-
out our history, placed the fulcrum between liberal property
rights and community rights at different places.190  Of course,
even so staunch a supporter of property rights as Richard Ep-
stein argues that sometimes it is appropriate to deny an injunc-
tion:  “[T]he appropriate solution is to allow injunctive relief
when the relative balance of convenience is anything close to
equal, but to deny it (in its entirety if necessary) when the bal-
ance of convenience runs strongly in favor of the defendant.”191
CONCLUSION:  TOWARD A HUMANITARIAN ANALYSIS OF
PROPERTY LAW
The morality of figuring out the border between private and
community property rights is difficult, to say the least.  Those
questions involve complex issues of deciding what is required by
the Constitution and statutes, as well as common law principles
like nuisance, trespass, and covenants.  Common law analysis in-
cludes questions of how much we want to protect property and
the expectations that arise around those protections in order to
encourage further productive use of property.  Moreover, the
protection of expectations furthers the idea of the rule of law
itself, as generations of defenders of property remind us.192  In
considering where to place the boundaries between community
and property in takings analysis, Frank Michelman phrased the
188 For example, when an injunction was denied in Brown  after the balancing of
equities, the servient landowner was left with little recourse, because the trespass
damages were nominal.  715 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1986).
189 Damages judgments are still large in some cases.  For instance, the damages
awarded in Boomer  were significantly larger than the damages that the New York
Court of Appeals initially thought would be owed. See  Farber, supra  note 164, at 7,
12.
190 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY:  COMPETING VI-
SIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 1 (1997) (coun-
tering view that there is “a single tradition of property throughout American
history”).
191 Epstein, supra  note 184, at 2102.
192 See, e.g. , Hon. Loren A. Smith, Life, Liberty & Whose Property?:  An Essay on
Property Rights , 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055 (1996).
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considerations as ones of utility and fairness.193  More recently,
Michael A. Heller and James E. Krier have agreed with that
analysis, though they speak in terms of efficiency and justice.194
However, considerations like humanitarianism and economic ef-
ficiency are notoriously difficult to judge.195
Recent discussion of cultural property has led to rich theo-
rizing about the public’s right to property and private claims on
it.  Sometimes that has led to some surprising results.  John Mer-
ryman’s analysis of which country has the better claim on the
Elgin Marbles—the United Kingdom, where the marbles have
been since the early nineteenth century, or Greece, where they
were carved and had been for several millennia before Lord El-
gin brought them to the United Kingdom—asks, in essence,
where will the marbles do the most good.196  He argues that the
marbles have become the property of the world, and people will
benefit most from keeping the marbles in the British Museum.197
The benefit to humanity may, indeed, be maximized by keeping
the marbles where they can be seen by the most people and
where they can be seen in the context of other art.  What is im-
portant and striking is that the good of the community is ad-
vanced as the primary basis for considering what to do with the
marbles.  That is, utility, rather than entitlement or justice based
on past harm, is at the center point of the argument.198
Aloha jurisprudence is as yet rather vaguely defined, but there
is a key aspect: concern for Native Hawaiians and other dispos-
sessed groups in Hawaii.  With time, as the jurisprudence devel-
ops and is articulated, we may yet be able to provide some
meaningful content and some judicially recognizable standards,
193 Frank L. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law , 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1226 (1967).
194 Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Commentary, Deterrence and Distribu-
tion in the Law of Takings , 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998-99 (1999).
195 Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassion-
ate , 89 VA. L. REV. 753, 767-70 (2003); see also Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is
There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence? , 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1398
(2002) (concluding that there is a conservative jurisprudence).
196 John Henry Merryman, Whither the Elgin Marbles? , in IMPERIALISM, ART
AND RESTITUTION 98, 106-08 (John Henry Merryman ed., 2006) (looking to nation-
centered, world-centered, and object-centered analysis and concluding that each po-
sition favors keeping the marbles in the United Kingdom).
197 Id.
198 See id.  at 98, 107-08; cf.  William St. Clair, Imperial Appropriations of the Par-
thenon , in IMPERIALISM, ART AND RESTITUTION, supra note 196, at 65 (viewing the
Parthenon’s entire history as one of imperialism).
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much as has happened with conservative constitutional thought
in the past two decades.199  Possibly there will soon be law review
scholarship that constructs aloha jurisprudence.200
Perhaps in thinking about a humanitarian analysis of property
law we should be looking at several features:  first, the historical
role that humanitarian considerations have played in judicial de-
cision making about property;201 second, the acknowledged role
for equitable considerations; and third, the ways to quantify hu-
manity, that is, the question of how much we protect, in some
fairly direct form, the interests of the dispossessed.  Of course,
there ought to be some consideration of overall utility.202  But we
can still ask if we are making sure that our decisions preserve the
dignity and humanity of people who are left in front of a judge.
We have known for a long time that judges’ decisions have an
important impact on the distribution of property.  Common law
decisions influence the distribution of wealth, as both law and
economic scholars203 and critical legal studies scholars have
taught us.204  We may also want to consider the impact of their
decisions on considerations of humanity as well.  This can come
about in several ways.  First, we can require that before property
is lost—such as through adverse possession or tax sale—there is
at least a strict compliance with common law requirements.  Sec-
ond, we can make sure that long-established rights, like the right
of beach access, are respected.  And third, we can invoke equity
principles when apportioning rights to access or use property in
cases of easements and covenants.  The common law has devel-
oped a set of rules to apportion rights between sets of property
owners (as in easement and covenant cases) and between prop-
199 See, e.g. , Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics , 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002).
200 One might envision the development of a similar body of scholarship that de-
fines the contours of aloha jurisprudence as there is, to take an example, around the
movement known as LatCrit. See, e.g. , Steven W. Bender & Keith Aoki, Seekin’ the
Cause:  Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community , 81 OR. L. REV. 595
(2002); Ibrahim J. Gassama, Confronting Globalization:  Lessons from the Banana
Wars and the Seattle Protests , 81 OR. L. REV. 707 (2002).
201 See  Brophy, supra  note 25, at 1207-12 (discussing considerations of humanity
and economy in antebellum jurisprudence).
202 As Judge Wilkinson has emphasized, there are important questions of whether
by making decisions to help one person we work a greater injustice overall. See
Wilkinson, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassionate , supra  note 195, at
765-66.
203 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence , 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
204 See, e.g. , HORWITZ, supra  note 161, at 61-108.
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erty owners and the community (as in nuisance cases).  Those
rules balance competing interests and look in particular to the
interests of society in deciding whether to grant an injunction be-
tween competing users.
Those may be some guiding principles to think about when
balancing the rights of the community with property owners.205
And perhaps as courts search for reasonable accommodations,
they will continue to consider the effects of their decisions on the
delicate balance that must be struck between property and com-
munity rights and realize that too much infringement on either
leads to inequitable results.  Our Constitution, as Justice Hugo
Black wrote in 1960, protects against forcing people “to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”206  Out in the remote provinces, some
judges are making sure that neither the community nor individu-
als are asked to give up rights that they have long held.  Perhaps
there will be a growing appreciation of those principles else-
where as well.
Adherents of aloha jurisprudence may borrow the refrain from
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man , sung by a crowd in Harlem at the
end of the “Battle Hymn of the Republic”:
No more dispossesing of the dispossessed!
No more dispossesing of the dispossessed!207
The difficulty, of course, is converting those ideas into legal
doctrine.208
205 Among the recent literature, Eric T. Freyfogle’s The Land We Share:  Private
Property and Common Good  (2003), stands out as a particularly rich exploration of
the competing considerations of public and private rights.
206 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
207 RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 332 (Modern Library 1994) (1947).
208 It becomes even more difficult when we consider that we must translate those
sentiments in a way that ensures the maintenance of respect for property rights that
have been so central to the advancement of society. See, e.g. , JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999) (as-
serting that private property is essential to liberty and democracy).
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